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Abstract 
Use of formal techniques for verifying the  security 
features of electronic commerce protocols would facilitate, the 
enhancement   of   reliability   of   such    protocols,   thereby 
increasing their usability. This paper projects the application 
of logic programming techniques for formal verification of a 
well referred security and  transactions protocol, the NetBill. 
The   paper   uses   ALSP   (Action   Language   for   Security 
Protocols) as  an efficient formal specification language and 
SMODELS a model generator to formally analyze  and  plan 
attacks on the protocol. 
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1.   Introduction 
Electronic commerce enables business  transactions 
through the internet, when a direct interaction  between the 
parties in a business deal is seemingly difficult. It operates in 
an open business environment where it is not  mandatory 
for 
any trust relationship to hold between the engaging  parties. 
Therefore, the protocols that facilitate the exchange of services 
over  the  internet  and  form  the  basis  of  a   
commercial transaction are inculcated with security features, 
which aim at minimizing the possibilities of a fraudulent 
activity. 
Considering the security of such protocols,  besides 
the assumption that perfect cryptographic techniques  ensure 
inclusion of basic properties like authentication,  privacy and 
integrity into a protocol. There are other  characteristics like 
atomicity[7] that arise at a higher level and are specific to the 
electronic commerce protocols. Atomic transactions form the 
corner stone  of the modern transaction processing theory[8]. 
Atomicity  is  a  property  which  allows  us  to  logically  link 
multiple operations of a protocol, in such a way that either all 
of them are executed during a  protocol run or none of them 
are.  It  is  important  that  all  electronic  commerce  systems 
ensure    atomicity  as  most  non  atomic  systems  like 
Digicash[12] or First Virtua[13] are either too  expensive to 
implement or are severely flawed[7]. 
 
Introduction of formal techniques for  verification 
will not only ascertain the presence or  absence of the above 
mentioned characteristics in the protocols, but would also help 
analysts  in  designing  and  optimizing  electronic  commerce 
systems. In view to this, the novelty of this paper is to use a 
logic   programming[5] approach for formally specifying 
NetBill[9] a prominent electronic commerce protocol.  Later, 
we analyze the claims, both for[11] and against[10] NetBill‟s 
goods  atomicity[7]  and  reproduce  a  model  for  an  attack 
similar to the one proposed in [10]. The paper emphasizes on 
the use of ALSP (Action Language for Security Protocol)[1] 
and state based description of the protocol for its analysis and 
verification. 
ALSP  is an  executable specification  language  for 
representing security protocols and  checking violations they 
are vulnerable to [1][2]. It is based on logic  programming, 
with stable model semantics [4]. Logic Programming enables 
one with declarative ease to  specify the actions of 
different agents  in  a  protocol.   This  includes  both  the  
operational 
behavior of a protocol, along with the possible security attacks 
of an intruder. A protocol trace is viewed as a plan to achieve 
a goal and the security attacks become  plans, which 
achieve goals that correspond to security violations. A 
specification in ALSP,   is   executable   using   
SMODELS[6]   as   a   model generator. 
A   protocol   trace   can   be   written   using   logic 
programming with stable model semantics. All stable models 
for  the  solution  set  of  logic  programs  are   minimal   and 
grounded in nature, where each atom  has a justification in 
terms  of  the  program  [3].  The  minimalism  and  grounded 
characteristics, make ALSP particularly suitable for specifying 
payment and transactions protocols; as we are able to  derive 
exactly what happened which lead to a security violation. The 
model generated by executing the specification also specifies 
that every action, which occurred during the execution of the 
specification,  has  a  justification  behind  it.  Similarly  if  the 
execution of the specification does not reveals a model then, it 
can be declaratively stated that there exists no plan to achieve 
that violation. 
Specification   of   a   protocol   in   ALSP   requires 
inculcation   of  concepts  of  robotic  planning[2].   Security 
protocols are reframed as planning problems,  where agents 
exchange messages and are subject to  attacks by 
intruders. The initial state of a protocol is defined in terms of 
messages already exchanged by the  agents and information 
they have derived from them.  A goal state is defined as an 
unwanted state  where   an   attack  has  already  occurred.  
Actions  are specified as exchange of messages amongst 
agents. If  there exists a plan to achieve the goal, we state that 
the protocol is 
 
 
 
 
 
flawed with scope for a security violation. A solution  to 
the planning problem if any is a sequence of steps that leads 
to a goal  state,  corresponding  to  an   attack.  A  more  
explicit discussion on protocol specification using ALSP can 
be found in the works of Aiello and Massacci[3]. 
In Section 2 of the paper, we begin with a mention 
of some important security features for  electronic commerce 
protocols. Section 3 deals with the explanation of the NetBill 
protocol and the notations used in the paper. The development 
of   the   specification   for   the   protocol,   using   the   logic 
programming techniques  is  explained in the Section 4. We 
finally specify attacks on the NetBill protocol and produce our 
results in Section 5, which is followed by  the conclusion 
of our work. 
 
2. Security in Electronic Commerce 
Security  is  a  primary  concern  for  all   electronic 
commerce transactions. The security features, as suggested by 
the PODC Community[14] for electronic commerce protocols 
include: 
atomic transactions 
cryptographically secure protocols 
secure computations 
high reliability 
For our analysis of the NetBill protocol, we will focus only on 
the aspect of atomicity. Tygar[7] explains the  importance of 
atomicity in electronic commerce. Atomicity as a 
characteristic   can  be  further  classified  into  three  distinct 
levels.  Each  level caters to  a separate security aspect in  a 
transaction.  These  levels  include  money  atomicity,   goods 
atomicity and certified delivery [7]. 
2.1  Money Atomicity 
A protocol is stated to be money atomic, if no creation or 
destruction of money takes place during  the  protocol run. In 
simpler terms, during a transaction in a protocol, neither of the 
participating agents should  create nor destroy money which 
they intend to transfer to the other participating agent  of the 
protocol. 
2.2  Goods  Atomicity 
Goods atomic protocols effect an exact transfer of goods 
for money[7]. This characteristic eliminates all possibilities of 
an agent getting goods without paying for them or vice-versa. 
All goods atomic protocols are inherently money atomic. 
2.3 Certified Delivery 
Certified delivery protocols enable all engaging parties, 
to prove exactly what goods have been delivered through the 
protocol run. They are extremely helpful  in  scenarios where 
both  the  merchant  and  the  customers  are  not  trusted.  All 
protocols that ensure a certified delivery are also  goods 
and money atomic. 
As NetBill [9] is intended to be used for the sale and 
purchase   of   information   goods.   Goods   atomicity   is   an 
important consideration for all  information goods protocols. 
NetBill has previously been proved to be goods  atomic[11], 
we  will  test  the  validity  of  this  formally  using  the  logic 
programming approach and show the richness and competence 
of ALSP as formal  verification language in verifying similar 
attacks on different protocols. 
3. The NetBill Protocol 
The  NetBill[9]  security  and  transactions  protocol 
was  proposed  in  the  year  1995.  NetBill  is   system   for 
micropayments  for  information  goods   on  the  internet.  It 
provides for strong authentication,  privacy and atomicity in 
payment and delivery of goods. A NetBill transaction model 
involves   three   active  parties  namely,   the  customer,   the 
merchant/vendor and the NetBill transaction server.  Figure 1 
gives a brief view of interaction between the different parties 
in a NetBill transaction model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Parties in NetBill transaction [9] 
[ ] Transaction Protocol; [----] Auxiliary Protocol 
3.1   Notations 
The notations used throughout the paper to explain the NetBill 
protocol and its cryptographic operations are: 
 
U, V, T are agents to the protocol. 
UV: M, can be understood as agent(U) sends the 
message(M) to the agent(V) in the protocol. 
U:  M, can be understood as agent(U)  synthesizes 
message(M) 
EG: encrypted goods 
H(EG):    hash value of the encrypted goods(EG) 
EPO: electronic payment order 
Sv(M):    agent(V)‟s signatures on message(M) 
 
3.2 Protocol description 
The protocol enables a vendor(V) and a user(U) to 
sell and buy information goods over the internet. The protocol 
being   non-optimistic   in   nature,   the   NetBill   transaction 
server(T) acts as a  trusted third party and is central to 
the 
protocol run. All transactions between  the user(U)  and  the 
vendor(V) take place with the help of the  NetBill 
server(T) and it is assumed that the server(T)  is always 
online.NetBill has  three  distinct  phases,  each  of  which  
depends  on  the 
success of the previous phases. 
The negotiation phase is the initial phase,  which 
involves both the user(U) and the vendor(V) agreeing on the 
prices for the goods and the services to be exchanged. We will 
not make   specific mention of these steps in our  design and 
protocol   specification   as   the   security   characteristics   of 
privacy, authentication and  atomicity  are not inherent in the 
negotiation phase[11]. 
 
UV: Price Quote Request 
VU: Price Quote 
 
The  second  phase  is  a   delivery  phase   which 
involves the user(U) sending a purchase request(for the agreed 
prices)  to  the  vendor(V).  The  vendor(V)  then  encrypts  the 
ordered goods, along with the hash of the encrypted goods and 
sends it back to the user(U). 
UV: Purchase Request 
V: EG, H(EG) 
VU: EG, H 
 
The payment phase follows the delivery  phase in 
which the user(U) transfers a synthesized electronic payment 
order(EPO) to the vendor(V). The  vendor(V) signs the 
EPO and concatenates it along with the specific key(K) with 
which, it had earlier encrypted the goods delivered to the 
respective user(U).  It  then  forwards  this  information  to  the  
NetBill transaction server(T). The server(T) credits  the 
vendor(V)‟s account  with  the  money  from  the  EPO.  It  
then  signs  the key(K) forwarded by the  vendor(V) and 
sends it back to the vendor(V). The  signature is later 
forwarded  to  the user(U) which then decrypts the goods with 
the relevant key(K). 
 
U: EPO 
UV: EPO 
VT: Sv(EPO, K) 
TV: ST(receipt, K) 
VU: ST(receipt, K) 
 
There  also  exists  an  optional  phase   where  the 
user(U)  directly  communicates  with  the  NetBill  server(T), 
when it fails to receive the signed key from the vendor(V). 
 
UT: transaction enquiry 
TU: ST(receipt, K) 
 
4. Specification of NetBill using ALSP 
ALSP is based on logic programming with  stable 
model semantics[2]. A logic program is defined by rules. We 
formalize and frame all actions in a protocol specification as 
logic program rules[3]. Therefore every time rule holds true, 
an action is said to be performed and the protocol is assumed 
to have reached a new state. Following the logic programming 
approach all  rules comprise of a head and a body [2]. 
The head and the body in each rule is separated by a [:--] to 
make it syntactically correct for the SMODELS model  
generator. The left hand side head literals hold true if and 
only if all the literals on the right hand side body  are true. 
A syntactically correct example of a rule would be: 
q :- not p, s. 
 
The above rule is read as “q iff( not p && s)”. Here „q‟, „p‟ 
and „s‟ are literals and we can state informally that „q‟ is true 
if and only if „p‟ is not true and „s‟ is true. 
We start specifying the protocol by considering the 
basic sort predicates(predicates which are not governed by any 
rules, mentioned in the specification) first[3]. We state clearly 
the  background  theory(initial  state  of  the  protocol)  which 
contains all the rules describing, how a message is composed 
and decrypted by the agents. It includes the property of keys 
shared and how information is attained by agents participating 
in  a protocol. The basic sort predicates that we will  use 
to specify the NetBill protocol are similar to ones taken from 
the works of Aiello and Massacci[3].  Though, a few 
predicates that  cater  specifically  to   the  NetBill  protocol  
are  added 
intentionally to its specification. They include: 
 
encryptedGoodHashPair(EncGood, Hash (1) 
goodsDescriptionQuotePair(GD, Quote) (2) 
 
While    writing    the    specification    it    becomes 
imperative  to  add  basic  sort  predicates  depending  on  the 
assumptions  that  form  the  basis  of  the  specification.  For 
example,  the  definition  of  predicate(1)  has  enabled  us  to 
ensure that for every encrypted good(EncGood) there exists a 
hash  value(Hash) which is specific to the encrypted good. 
Similarly predicate(2) states that for every goods 
description(GD) that a customer  may forward  to a vendor, 
there exists a quote(Quote) with which the vendor will reply to 
the customers goods request. 
The list of predicates that are inculcated is immense 
and all of them cannot be discussed here. It is also impossible 
to state and explain the entire protocol  specification. So, 
we will  focus  on  how to  write  the  specification  based  on  
the assumptions and the states that a protocol attains during a 
run. Later,  a  classical  unit  action  of  an  agent,  which  
includes receiving a  message, deriving information from the 
message and  then replying to it will be specified and 
explained  using ALSP. 
A  protocol  specification  requires  a  description  of 
what states the protocol reaches and what are the actions that 
lead to that state. To do the same, we give a phase wise state 
analysis of the NetBill[9] protocol. Below each state, is a set 
of  preconditions  that  must  hold  true  for  that  state  to  be 
attained.  The  notations  used  for   protocol   description  are 
identically similar to the one described in [section 3.1]. 
 
4.1  The Negotiation Phase (N/P) 
 
[State 1] UV: Price Quote Request 
Pre-Condition: None 
 
[State 2] V receives Price Quote Request 
Pre-Condition: [State 1] 
 
[State 3] V, synthesizes a Price Quote 
Pre-Condition: [State 2] 
 
[State 4] VU: Quote 
Pre-Condition: [State 2, 3] 
 
[State 5] U, receives Quote from V 
Pre-Condition:[State 4] 
 
[State 6] U, accepts transaction with V 
Pre-Condition:[State 5] 
 
Now, for the sake of more clarity, we will see how 
an action is specified in ALSP. Let us consider the States(2), 
(3) and  (4) of the negotiation phase.  These states together 
comprise  of  a  unit  action  of  a  vendor(V)  which  includes 
receiving  a  price  quote  request,  synthesizing  a  quote  and 
sending   the    quote   to   the   relevant   customer(U).   The 
nomenclature of all the literals and atomic functions  in 
the specification is highly intuitive and is indicative of the 
action an agent takes when the protocol is in  the desired 
state. The specification of the states(2), (3) and (4)  in ALSP 
would be: 
 
receivedQuoterequest(V,QuoteRequest):- 
sendQuoterequest(U, V, QuoteRequest), 
vendor(V),user(U), 
quotereq(QuoteRequest). (A) 
synthesizePriceQuote(V, Price):- 
receiveQuoterequest(V, QuoteRequest), 
vendor(V), priceValue(Price), 
quotereq(QuoteRequest). (B) 
 
sendQuote(V, U, Price):- 
synthesizePriceQuote(V, Price), 
receivedQuoterequest(V,QuoteRequest), 
user(U), vendor(V), 
priceValue(Price). (C) 
 
The  rule(A)  ensures  that  a  state  in   which   the 
vendor(V) receives a quote request is true if and only if, the 
user(U) had earlier send the quote  request to the 
vendor(V). Which would be true, only if there existed a valid 
user(U), a vendor(V) and a quote request. 
The  rule(B)  ensure  that   the  state  in   which   a 
vendor(V) synthesizes a price quote is true if and only if, the 
vendor(V)  has  earlier  received  a  quote  request   from  the 
user(U). 
The  rule(C)  ensures  that  the  state  in   which  a 
vendor(V) sends a price quote to the user(U) is true if and only 
if, he has synthesized a price quote for the respective user(U) 
from  which  he had  received  a quote  request.  Similarly all 
actions for the Negotiation Phase can be  specified easily 
in ALSP. 
 
4.2  The Delivery Phase (D/P) 
[State 1] UV: Purchase Request 
Pre-Condition: [State 6(N/P)] 
 
[State 2] V, receives the purchase request 
Pre-Condition: [State 1] 
 
[State 3] V, stores the purchase request 
Pre-Condition: [State 2] 
 
[State 4] V, generates a random key 
Pre-Condition: [State 3] 
 
[State 5] V, encrypts the goods which it 
intends to send corresponding to 
the purchase request. 
Pre-Condition: [State 3, 4] 
 
[State 6] V, generates hash corresponding 
to the encrypted goods 
Pre-Condition: [State 5] 
 
[State 7] VU: Sends encrypted goods and 
hash of goods 
Pre-Condition: [State 5, 6] 
 
[State 8] U, receives the encrypted goods 
and the hash value 
Pre-Condition: [State 7] 
 
[State 9] U, compares hash value with the 
encrypted goods 
Pre-Condition: [State 8] 
 
The send and receives states for the user(U) and the 
vendor(V)  are  similar  in  nature  to  that  of  the  Negotiation 
Phase. To  enable encryption by the  vendor(V) we have to 
specify separately his ability  to generate a random key and 
store it for further transactions. It can be inherently assumed in 
the protocol specification that a valid hash function has been 
pre-established between the user(U) and the vendor(V) and is 
outside the scope of the protocol. 
 
4.3  The Payment Phase (P/P) 
[State 1] U, generates the Electronic 
Payment Order(EPO) 
Pre-Condition: [State 6(N/P), 
9(D/P)] 
 
 
[State 2] UV: EPO 
Pre-Condition: [State 1] 
[State 3] V, receives EPO from U 
Pre-Condition: [State 3] 
 
[State 4] V, signs EPO + Key 
Pre-Condition: [State 3, 2(D/P)] 
 
 
[State 5] VT:  Sv(EPO,  Key) 
Pre-Condition: [State 4] 
 
[State 6] T, receives Sv(EPO,  Key) 
Pre-Condition: [State 5] 
 
[State 7] T, signs the Key with his 
signatures 
Pre-Condition: [State 6] 
 
[State 8] TV:  ST(receipt, Key) 
Pre-Condition: [State 6, 7] 
 
[State 9] V,receives the signed Key from T 
Pre-Condition: [State 8] 
 
[State 10] VU:  ST(receipt, Key) 
Pre-Condition: [State 9] 
 
The generation of the Electronic Payment 
Order(EPO) by the user(U) depends on the information saved 
by  user  at  the  time  of  accepting   the  transaction  in  
the Negotiation Phase(N/P). The  EPO is generated only 
after a successful comparison  of the hash value with the 
encrypted goods transmitted during the Delivery Phase(D/P). 
The ALSP specification for the generation of the EPO would 
be: 
 
electronicPaymentOrder(sk(U), GoodDescription, 
Price, hash(f, encryptGoods(K, Goods))):- 
comparesHash(U), 
userKnowsEncryptedGoods(U, encGoods(K, 
Goods)), 
userKnowsHash(U,hash(f,encryptGoods( K, 
Goods))). 
(D) 
 
The rule(D) ensures that the synthesis of the 
Electronic Payment Order occurs if and only if the user(U) has 
a   knowledge   of   the   encrypted   goods;   the   hash   value 
transmitted by the vendor(V) and the user(U) has successfully 
compared the two together. It is evident from the head  of the 
rule that the EPO contains a good description, the money to be 
debited  and  the hash value of the encrypted goods which is 
later forwarded to the NetBill Transaction server(T). 
 
4.4  The Optional Phase (O/P) 
[State 1] UT: transaction enquiry 
Pre-Condition:[State 10(P/P)] 
 
[State 2] TU: ST(receipt, Key) 
Pre-Condition:[State 1] 
 
The  first  step  of  the  Optional  Phase(O/P)  occurs 
when the user(U) is unable to get the decrypting key(K) from 
the   vendor(V).   The   user(U)   then   enquires   the   NetBill 
server(T)  about  the  transaction.  The  NetBill  server(T)  in 
response to the transaction enquiry resends the signed key(K) 
and the receipt of the transaction with the vendor(V), directly 
to  the  user(U).  The  formal  specification  of  the  optiontal 
transaction enquiry in ALSP would be: 
 
transactionEnquiry(U, T, transactionenquiry, 
Time):- 
not receiveUserReceipt(U,receipt ( 
sk(T), K, computedReceipt(R)), Time) 
(E) 
The rule(E) ensures that  a transaction enquiry from 
user(U)  to  the  NetBill  server(T)  is  true  if and  only  if the 
user(U) has not received the signed receipt and  the key(K) 
from the  server(T) in time. This completes the specification of 
the protocol. 
But, a model for a security violation also  needs 
a goal state that corresponds to that attack[3]. While planning 
an attack  on  a  protocol,  we  must  concentrate  on  a  
security guarantee(like  authentication, privacy, atomicity), a 
protocol intends  to offer, which we aim to prove is void. 
An ALSP 
specification that challenges that guarantee is tested as a goal 
state.   If   there   exists   a   model   for   the   challenge,   we 
declaratively  conclude  that  protocol  is  flawed  and  there  is 
scope for a violation which corresponds to our specified goal 
state. 
 
4 . Specification of Attacks on NetBill 
NetBill protocol is used for purchase and  sale of 
information  goods[9].  It  is  imperative  for  an  information 
goods protocol to be goods atomic[7]. There have been claims 
both  for  and  against  the  goods  atomicity  of  the  NetBill 
protocol. Researchers Ogata and Futasugi[10]    claimed that 
the NetBill is not goods atomic. While  specifying the 
goal state, we are following their  assumptions about the 
protocol and  check  whether  our  approach  is  competent  
enough  to 
specify formally the attack proposed by them. 
In order to define a goal state that would correspond 
to security violations challenging the  goods  atomicity of the 
protocol, we would have to enable the user(U) to judge a valid 
decryption of the goods he ordered at the end of the protocol 
run. To do the same, we add an extra rule in our specification 
which would judge the validity of the decrypted goods. 
 
userSuccessfullDecryption(U, Goods):- 
K1=K, 
knowsReceipt(U, sk(T), K1, 
computedReceipt(R)), 
userKnowsEncryptedGoods(U, 
encryptGoods(K, Goods)). (F) 
 
The rule(F) of the protocol specification ensures that 
there exists a successful decryption of the goods(Goods) if and 
only if the key(K1) received from  the server(T) is the 
same key(K) with which the  vendor(V) had encrypted the 
goods which were transferred to the user(U). 
An attack claiming that NetBill is not goods atomic 
would define a scenario in which the user(U)  pays for 
the goods, but is unable to receive correct  goods which it 
had ordered  prior  to  the  payment.  Using  the  concepts  of 
logic programming and planning, we finally specify our goal 
state. 
 
Attack(U) :- 
not userSuccessfullDecryption(U, Goods, 
knowsReceipt(U, sk(T), K1, 
computedReceipt(R)), 
electronicPaymentOrder(sk(U), 
GoodDescription, Price, hash(f, 
encryptGoods(K, Goods))). 
 
The “Attack(U)” of the specification explains a state in which 
the user is unable to successfully decrypt the goods at the end 
protocol run. Although for the same  transaction the 
user(U) had generated an EPO for  which a corresponding 
endorsed receipt(signifying   a   debit)   has   been   received   
from   the server(T). 
We now use the SMODELS[6], model generator to 
test  the  specification  and  see  if  there  exists  an  attack  on 
NetBill. The results vary based on our assumptions about the 
honesty of the vendor(V) in the protocol. Therefore they have 
been categorized into the following cases. 
CASE 1: The vendor is assumed to be honest  and 
does not transmit two different keys for the same transaction. 
 
 
MODEL GENERATED: 0 
userSuccessfullDecryption(U, Goods) :  TRUE 
Attack(U)  : FALSE 
 
CASE 2: The vendor is assumed to be dishonest and 
is capable of   transmitting two different  keys for the 
same transaction. 
 
MODEL GENERATED: 1 
userSuccessfullDecryption(U, Goods) : FALSE 
Attack(U)  : TRUE 
 
We are able get a model for our assumption in Case 2. 
This result corresponds to the result proposed  by Ogata 
and Futasugi[10].  A  similar  approach  for  specification  can  
be adopted for other security and transactions protocols as 
well. Although our results show that NetBill is not goods 
atomic, it cannot  be   stated  declaratively,  as  NetBill  has  a  
devised contingency mechanism for similar security threats  
which is external to the protocol scope. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The   logic   programming   approach   for    formal 
verification of security protocols, unlike other methodologies 
prevents  analysts  from  learning   scripting  styles  that  are 
specific to those  methodologies. The syntax is intuitive and 
generic    in    nature,    which    makes    specifications    more 
comprehensible to people. Besides, the approach can be used 
in  formal  verification  of  a  wide  plethora  of  protocols.  A 
problem with this approach  may be that the specification for 
complex protocols becomes very lengthy and time taking. But, 
being executable in nature, it enables us to study a generated 
model, based on the specification of an attack and determine 
exactly  what  went  wrong   during  the  protocol  run.  
This 
property comes handy in not only determining security threats, 
but also designing and optimizing protocols. 
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